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Department of Computer Science, Edinburgh University, Edinburgh EH8 9YL, Scotland, U.K. 
Abstract. Simple modal logics for Milner’s SCCS and CCS are presented. We offer sound and 
complete axiomatizations of validity relative to these calculi as models. Also we present composi- 
tional proof systems for when a program satisfies a formula. These involve proof rules which are 
like Gentzen introduction rules except that there are also introduction rules for the program 
combinators of SCCS and CCS. The compositional rules for restriction (or hiding) and parallel 
combinators arise out of a simple semantic strategy. 
Introduction 
Transition systems are often used as models of concurrent programs. By themselves 
they are too concrete for determining when one program could be computationally 
equivalent to, or could approximate, another. Addition of a plausible computational 
equivalence or preorder on transition systems overcomes this. An alternative addition 
is logical languages whose semantics are defined on transition systems. Two programs 
are equivalent relative to a logical language if they have the same transition system 
properties expressible in it (and program p approximates q if q has more properties 
than p). The expressive power of the language is then the determining feature. A 
coherence is attainable when a natural logical language characterizes a plausible 
computational equivalence or preorder: this happens when the two equivalences or 
preorders coincide. Then they reinforce each other as appropriate to the analysis 
of concurrency. 
In [ 141 the authors propose a computational equivalence, observation (or bisimu- 
lation) equivalence, on transition systems as well as a logical language, Hennessy- 
Milner logic, which characterizes it. Hennessy-Milner logic is a very simple modal 
language. In [23] transition systems are extended to cope with a notion of divergence 
and also generalizes observation equivalence into a computational preorder: under 
the preorder divergent programs approximate similar convergent ones. A simple 
amendment to the semantics of Hennessy-Milner logic results in a logical language 
which characterizes the preorder. 
This paper is a logical exploration of these characterizing modal languages (and 
their variants). One enterprise is to supply sound and complete axiomatizations 
relative to families of transition system models. The axiomatization of Hennessy- 
Milner logic turns out to be a classical normal modal logic. In contrast, the 
axiomatization of its amendment, which caters for divergence, is an intuitionistic 
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modal logic. (The law of excluded middle fails because of divergence.) Proofs of 
finite model properties (omitted here) supply decision procedures. 
A more specific enterprise is to examine the modal languages in the context of 
particular transition systems. The systems chosen are Milner’s CCS and SCCS. 
These were presented as tractable models of concurrent systems: CCS models 
asynchronous systems which may also synchronize, while SCCS exclusively models 
synchronous systems. SCCS/CCS processes (programs) are generated from a small 
number of combinators. The classical axiomatization remains sound and complete 
relative to these transition systems (and so does a version of the inuitionistic system 
for CCS with internal actions when divergence amounts to infinite internal chatter). 
The result is ‘endogenous’ logics for SCCS and CCS. More interesting would be 
compositional, syntax-directed, proof systems. Let p t A mean ‘A is provable of 
p’. A compositional system would build the proof of p t A from subproofs involving 
the subcomponents of p (and, possibly, the subformulas of A). But where 11 is an 
interesting binary parallel operator there is little hope of finding a uniform binary 
function * on arbitrary formulas which will licence a rule of the form: 
P~-A qt-B 
pllq + A* B ’ 
Failure of such a principle is testimony to the complexity of concurrency: there 
does not seem to be a clean way of reasoning from the parts of a concurrent system 
to the whole. 
A simple semantic strategy provides a method to overcome this problem. Let 
p k= A be the semantic correlate of p F A. A further semantic relation, a relativized 
relation A, B i= C, is introduced where A, B, and C are formulas. Its meaning is 
stipulated to be 
Vprograms p, q, if p + A and q k B, then p]J q b C. 
An immediate consequence is that if p k A, q k B, and A, B i= C, then p/q k C. 
This suggests a general method for reasoning about programs with arbitrary numbers 
of concurrent components. In principle, the pair of semantic relations produces a 
compositional semantics for (1. The semantic ploy suggests we introduce two proof- 
theoretic consequence relations. The resulting proof rule (introduction rule) for (1 
is then straightforward 
Unlike many logics for parallel programs, use of this rule will not presuppose (as 
a proof proceeds) either a fixed or bounded number of potential concurrent subcom- 
ponents. It allows one to treat [( as a first class program operator on a par with 
sequential composition. 
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We use this semantic strategy to provide sound and complete modal proof systems 
for both SCCS and CCS. The proof rules are introduction rules not only for the 
logical connectives but also for the combinators. Restriction, or hiding, is dealt with 
by extending the strategy. 
Further results on characterizing modal languages can be found in [3,15] and in 
the case of subsets of SCCS and CCS in [ 10, 11,291 and in Winskel’s related work 
[37,38]. The semantic strategy for parallel generalizes the proposal in [34, 351: the 
generalization allows us to cope with the hiding combinator. 
The paper is in two parts. Part 1 discusses transition systems and bisimulations 
(Section 1) and their modal characterizations (Section 2). Axiomatizations of two 
of the characterizing languages (Section 3) complete part one. Part two is concerned 
with proof systems for SCCS and CCS. Section 4 is introductory while Sections 5 
and 6 develop the modal proof systems. Finally, Section 7 contains the soundness 
and completeness proofs for Part 2. 
PART ONE 
1. Transition systems and bisimulations 
A nondeterministic or concurrent program may communicate repeatedly with its 
environment. A simple input/output function is, therefore, too austere as a model 
of such a program: two programs determining the same input/output function may 
behave very differently in the same environment. Transition systems have long been 
recognized as a richer model [17, 19, 22, 321. More recently they have been used 
extensively as models of concurrent programs within the framework of temporal 
logic [7, 20, 21, 301. Our interest here is transition systems whose transitions are 
labelled. 
Definition 1.1. A transition system is a triple (P, *, Act), where 
(i) P is a set (of processes); 
(ii) Act is a set (of actions); 
(iii) -) is a mapping which associates, with each a E Act, a relation -+LI c P x P. 
A transition system is finite branching if each relation -+O, a E Act, is image finite: 
---,a is image finite provided that, for each p E P, the set {q Ip -+a q} is finite. 
Transition systems are too concrete as models. No insight is offered as to when 
two processes (programs) are computationaly equivalent. In [14], the authors offer 
a framework for answering this question. The central idea is that two processes are 
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equivalent if no finite amount of experimentation (observation) can distinguish 
them. They view the set Act as a set of atomic experiments (or observations). An 
atomic experiment on a process p E P is understood as an attempt to communicate 
with p. A successful experiment on p implies participation of p itself: p may change 
depending on its internal structure. The relations -+O, a E Act, are intended to capture 
the effect of experimentation: p *a q means that p can evolve to q in response to 
an a-experiment, or 9 is the result of a successful a-experiment on p. A computation 
can then be viewed as a successful sequence of experiments (communications). 
Similar ideas are also contained in [ 1,6, 16,25,26]. 
Process equivalence in terms of experimental indistinguishability can be spelt out 
in a number of ways. The formal proposal in [14] is observation equivalence which 
is the same as bisimulation equivalence when the transition system is finite branching. 
Definition 1.2. A relation R c P x P on a transition system is a bisimulation just in 
case p R q ifl 
(i) VaVp’. if p 5 p’, then 3q’. q -1: q’ and p’ R q’, 
(ii) Vatlq’. if q 5 q’, then 3~‘. p -% p’ and p’ R q’. 
This definition characterizes a property a relation may or may not have on the 
transition system. (The identity relation, for instance, is always a bisimulation.) 
Such relations give rise to an equivalence, bisimulation equivalence, on processes in 
a transition system T: 
p -T q iff there is a bisimulation relation R such that p R q, 
It is a straightforward to check that -7 is an equivalence and, moreover, that it is 
also the maximal bisimulation under inclusion. 
Bisimulation equivalence is a very fine equivalence. For instance, consider the 
transition system in Fig. 1. Here p2 + q2 because p2, unlike q2, can respond success- 
fully to a b-experiment. Similarly, p z, unlike q3, can also respond successfully to a 
c-experiment. This means that p, + q,, even though they have the same computations 
(may respond to the same sequences of experiments). Strong connections between 
their respective intermediate states are also required. In general, it is these sorts of 
connections that are needed for comparing the behaviours of concurrent programs. 
A 
PI l a.pP2 q*.b.tiq. 
u q’ 
Fig. I 
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Bisimulations were proposed in [27] and have been further investigated in [24, 
331. Alternative equivalences based on experimental indistinguishability can be 
found in [6, 16,261. Even finer bisimulations allowing for infinite experimentation 
have been suggested [ 13, IS]. 
Suppose further that processes may also change by performing internal (unobserv- 
able) actions: for instance, by internally communicating. Now a process may also 
evolve autonomously without responding to experiments. This opens the possibility 
that a process could proceed for ever without accepting an experiment, for instance 
by engaging in infinite internal chatter. Call such a process globally divergent. Also, 
suppose we distinguish between the acceptance of an experiment and a process 
reporting success. For instance, we could imagine that after accepting an experiment 
a process reports success when it is not engaging in internal activity. Then a further 
possibility arises that global divergence may be conditional on the offer of an 
experiment: the offer of say an a-experiment but not a b-experiment may trigger a 
capacity for divergence-for instance, having accepted a the process forever engages 
in internal activity and, therefore, does not respond successfully to a. Thus, we can 
introduce local divergence, the notion of u-divergence, a E Act, as conditional global 
divergence. The definition of a transition system can be extended to cater for this 
possibility. 
Definition 1.3. An extended transition system is a quadruple (P, -, Act, t) where 
(i) P, +, Act are as in Definition 1.1; 
(ii) t is a mapping which associates with each a E Act a unary predicate ?a on I? 
Instead of Tu(p) we write ptu. The intended meaning of ptu is ‘p can u-diverge’. 
The negation of Tu, u-convergence, is written ia. This definition of an extended 
transition is based on [23] where only global divergence is considered. A globally 
divergent transition system satisfies the extra property: 
if ptu, then Vb E Act. p?b. 
A CCS-like extended transition system satisfies instead the additional property: 
if pJh and ptu, then 3q. Vc E Act. p s q and q?c. 
This terminology is explained in Section 4. 
In the case of extended transition systems, asking when one process computa- 
tionally approximates another is more appropriate than asking when two processes 
are computationally (experimentally) equivalent: it is natural to view a divergent 
process as approximating a similar convergent process. Mimer, therefore, proposes 
an experimental preorder on processes which may globally diverge [23]. A slight 
adjustment allows for local divergence. 
Definition 1.4. A relation R G P x P on an extended transition system is a partial 
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bisimulation just in case p R q iff 
(i) VaVp’. if p -% p’, then 3q’. q -5 q’ and p’ R q’; 
(ii) Vu. ifp&a, then q.la and 
Vq’. if q -% q’, then 3~‘. p s p’ and p’ R q’. 
Partial bisimulation relations give rise to a preorder on processes in an extended 
transition system ET: 
p &-,- q iff there is a partial bisimulation R such that p R 9. 
It is straightforward to show that c ET IS a preorder and that it is also the maximal 
partial bisimulation under inclusion. 
Note that if every process in ET is globally convergent (satisfies ia for every a), 
then ~~~ is just bisimulation equivalence. Hence, transition systems and bisimulation 
equivalence can be treated as special cases of extended transition systems and the 
partial bisimulation preorder. 
An extended transition system can be represented diagrammatically as a graph 
with each node (process) labelled by a set of actions representing the capacity for 
divergence (see Fig. 2 for example). Here, p3 c q3 and p3 c ri . But q3 4 r3 (and r3 E q1 
since r3 is globally convergent). Also, p, c q1 but p, FL r, because pr E r,. 
95 q6 
Fig. 2. 
2. Modal characterizations of bisimulations 
rl l Act 
A different view of when two processes (programs) are equivalent is when they 
have the same (relevant) properties. Let p t= A mean that the sentence A, from some 
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logical language, is true of process p. Where 3 is a logical language, let Z(p) = 
{A E 27( p k A}. Then p and 4 can be said to have the same properties expressible 
in d;p just in case .Z( p) = Z(q) (and p has fewer properties than q when Z(p) c 3( 9)). 
A natural endeavour is to seek logical languages which characterize computational 
equivalences/preorders: if = is a computational equivalence, then 3 characterizes 
= just in case 
Vp, q. .2(p) = .2(q) iff p = q. 
Similarly, when c is a computational preorder 3 characterizes c when 
VP, 9. T(p)Ez(q) ifl pc9. 
A characterization result yields a logic-independent criterion for the expressiveness 
of a (specification) language. Moreover, a natural characterizing language increases 
confidence in the computational equivalence/preorder. 
2.1. Characterizing - : classical Hennessy- Milner logic 
Hennessy and Milner present a modal logic which characterizes bisimulation 
equivalence on finite branching transition systems [ 141. Let T = (P, -+, Act) be a 
transition system and KT the modal language: 
A::=Tr(lAjA A Al( for a E Act. 
K7 is reminsicent of propositional dynamical logic [12]. Here however, the only 
atomic sentence is Tr(true) and only atomic actions appear within the modal 
operators. Moreover, unlike dynamic logic, the satisfaction relation I= is defined 
between processes (programs) and formulas: 
p k Tr for any p E P, 
pklA ifi p# A, 
~FAAB itfpl=AandpI=B, 
p k (a)A iff 3q. p -5 q and q k A. 
Tr(true) is true of every process. p I= (a)A means that p can evolve under some 
successful a-experiment to a process satisfying A. ‘Every process which is the result 
of a successful u-experiment on p satisfies A’ is expressed using negation by 
p k l(a)-~A. In particular, p k l(a)Tr means that p is u-deadlocked, that no 
u-experiment on p can be successful. 
The modal logic is expressively rich: it can say of processes what they cannot do 
as well as what they can do. This discriminating power is needed for the characteriz- 
ation of bisimulation equivalence. Hennessy and Milner, in effect, prove the follow- 
ing characterization theorem [ 141. 
Theorem 2.1. If T is Jnite branching, then K,(p) = K,(q) ij”p - .q. 
318 C. Stirling 
The properties expressible in K, are tied to the distinguishing powers of bisimula- 
tion equivalence: formulas of KT. cannot differentiate equivalent processes and vice 
versa. 
In the next section we shall give a complete axiomatization of the logic. It turns 
out to be a classical normal modal logic; classical in the sense that it is an extension 
of classical sentential logic. 
A negation-free version of KT also characterizes bisimulation equivalence. The 
avoidance of negation aids the development of compositional modal proof theories 
offered in Part 2. Let LT be the language 
A::=Tr]Fal/A A AIA v A((a)A([a]A where a E Act. 
Here, Fal stands for the KT-formula 1Tr and [a] is the dual of (a) (l(a)1 in KT). 
The additional semantic clauses are 
p# Fal, 
p+AvB iff pkAorpi=B, 
p b [a]A iff Vq. if p s q, then q i= A. 
Every formula of K, is equivalent to some _&-formula and every &-formula to 
some K,r-formula. The following is, therefore, a trivial corollary of Theorem 2.1. 
Corollary 2.2. If T is jifinite branching, then L,(p) = LT( q) iff p -T q. 
A further characterization result (which we shall appeal to in Section 6) is given 
by adding atomic sentences (Y for each finite subset cy of Act to L7.. The new semantic 
clause is 
pk= cy iff (a13q.p:q)Eu. 
Thus, p I= (Y if all the experiments p may successfully respond to are in (Y. Let L; 
be the resulting language. The following is almost immediate from the previous 
corollary. 
Corollary 2.3. If T is jinite branching, then L;(p) = L$( q) ifsp -T q. 
The condition that T is finite branching in Theorem 2.1 and its corollaries can 
be discarded if infinite conjunctions and disjunctions are allowed [ 151. 
2.2. Characterizing c_: intuitionistic Hennessy- Milner logic 
In [23], Mimer offers a modal characterization of the partial bisimulation preorder 
r= (assuming global divergence only) in terms of a pair of semantic relations. Plotkin 
suggested an alternative, simpler characterization [2X] which we now present. 
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Let LET be the modal language L defined on the extended transition system 
ET = (I’, -, Act, t). The semantic clauses for L ET coincide with LT except for [a]: 
p I= [a]A iff p&a and Vq. if p 5 q, then q b A. 
p k [a]A carries the added implication that p u-converges. When p can u-diverge, 
then p fails every formula of the form [a]A. Therefore, the formula [u]Tr expresses 
u-convergence. 
Theorem 2.4. If ET is finite branching, then LET(p) E LET(q) ifp cEr q. 
Proof. Assume ET is finite branching. (The index ET is now dropped from the proof.) 
(3): Let p s q iff L(p) E L(q). It suffices to show that c is a partial bisimulation 
relation. Suppose not. Then, for some p, q, p s q and either 
(9 P-+~ p’ and Vq’. q ---so q’ not( p’s q’), or 
(ii) p.la and qTu, or 
(iii) p.la and qdu and q-‘*q’ and VP’. p+‘p’ not(p’6 q’). 
Suppose (i) holds. Let the set q(u) ={q’lq --+(I q’}. By the finite-branching condi- 
tion, q(u) is finite. Suppose q(u) = f4. Then p k (u)Tr since p -+(1 p’. But q # (u)Tr 
and this contradicts p s q. 
Suppose q(u) = (41,. . . , 4:). Then, 3A,, . . . , A, such that p’I== A, and q: if A,. 
Thus, p k B where B = (u)(A, A. . AA,). But q # B since, for each q’E q(u), 
q’# A, A.. . A A,. Again, this contradicts p s q. 
Suppose (ii) holds: Then, p b [a]Tr and q # [u]Tr. 
Suppose (iii) holds: Let p(u) = {p’(p -+“ p’}. By the finite-branching condition, 
p(u) is finite. 
Suppose p(u) = 13. Then, since pJu, p b [ u]Fal. However, q # [ u]Fal since q -+a q’. 
This contradicts p G q. 
Suppose p(u) = {pi, . . . , p;}. Then, 3A,, . . . , A,, such that p: k A, and q’# A;. 
Hence, since p&u, p t= B where B = [ u](A, v . . . v A,, ). However, q # B since q -+a q’ 
and q’#A,v.. . v A,,. Again, this contradicts p 4 q. 
(+): Suppose p E q. We show by induction on A that if p i= A, then q k A. 
(1) A = Tr, Fal, B A C, B v C; straightforward. 
(2) A = (u)B: Then, p +’ p’ for some p’ and p’ b B. However, PC q and so q qa q’ 
and p’cq’. Hence, by induction hypothesis, q’b= B; but then, also, q b (u)B. 
(3) A = [u]B: Then, p.lu and VP’. p ---)(I p’ implies p’k B. Since pJu, also q&u. 
Suppose q -+’ q’ and q’ # B. However, p c q and so, since pi and qJ, p +“ pf and 
p’cq’. By induction hypothesis, p’# B also, but this is impossible. Hence, Vq’. 
q -)a q’ implies q’ I= B; that is, since qJu, also q k [u]B. 0 
The characterization states that p c ET q when the &,-properties of p are a subset 
of q’s: q may satisfy extra formulas. The LET- modal operators (a), [a] (unlike in 
L,) are not duals of each other. The situation is analogous to the nonduality of 
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quantifiers in intuitionistic logic. Plotkin suggested adding an intuitionistic implica- 
tion to LET. His intuitionistic semantics is in terms of topologies on processes [28]. 
By explicitly referring to the bisimulation preorder in the clause for implication we 
directly present an intuitionistic semantics. Let I,, be LET extended with implication 
-+. The extra semantic clause is 
p b A + B iff Vq.p c-ET q if q b A, then q i= B. 
(For an intuitionistsic semantics of IET based on a more syntactic preorder, see 
[38].) Negation is defined in the usual way: 1A is A --+ Fal. The complete axiomatiz- 
ation of valid Im formulas in the next section shows that the semantic clauses are 
intuitionistic. Evidence for this is the failure of excluded middle, A v 1A. Consider 
the extended transition system of Fig. 3. The process p can a-diverge unlike q and 
p c q. p is unable to respond to an a-experiment and so p # (a)Tr. Moreover, 
p # l(a)Tr because q i= (a)Tr. The logical language ZET also characterizes cm. 
Fig. 3 
Theorem 2.5. Zf ET is $nite branching, then I&P) C I,,(q) i#p GET 4. 
Proof. The index ET is dropped throughout. 
(=+): Clearly, I(p) c I(q) implies L(p) s L(q) since LE 1. Hence, by Theorem 
2.4, pEq. 
(e): Suppose pc q: By induction on A, if p b A, then a + A. The only case not 
covered by Theorem 2.4 is A = B + C. Then, for all rzp, if r b B, then r I= C. 
However, if 9’7 q, then q’zp; hence, if q’ I= B, then q’ k C; that is, q k B + C. Cl 
Another characterization of r= ET is now given. Let JET be the language IEr extended 
by new atomic sentences ua meaning ‘u-converges’. The semantic clauses for JET 
are as for ZET except in the case of [a] and except for the additional clause for vu: 
P@4U iff pb, 
p k [u]A iff Vq.p geT qtlq’. if q 5 q’, then q’ k A. 
The meaning of [a] in JET is closer to what might be expected in an intuitionistic 
semantics. Unlike IET, if p can u-diverge, then p will satisfy some formulas of the 
form [u]A (and, in particular, [u]Tr). JET also characterizes cET. 
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Theorem 2.6. Zf ET is finite branching, then .Z& p) G J&q) #p rET q. 
Proof. The proof closely follows Theorems 2.4 and 2.5. Again, the index ET is 
dropped throughout. 
(+): Suppose p c q: By induction on A, we show that if p k A, then q k A. The 
only cases not covered by Theorems 2.4 and 2.5 are: 
Case 1: A = 4~. Suppose p + Vu; then pka, but then, qiu and so q k &a 
Case 2: A=[u]Z?. Suppose p b [u]B: If qsq’ and q’-+” q” and q”# B, then, 
since p c q c q’, this contradicts p k [a JB. Hence, q I= [ u]B. 
(3): The proof is as in Theorem 2.4, except that we make use of the first half 
of the proof above. Let p c q iff _Z( p) c J(q). We show 5 is a partial bisimulation. 
Suppose not. The same three possibilities as in Theorem 2.4 arise. 
Case (i) is as before. 
Case (ii): p$q and qtu. But then, p + uu and q # ou which contradicts p s q. 
Case (iii): p&a and qJu and q-+*9’ and Vp’.p*“p’ not(p’sq’). Let p(u) = 
{p’lp *a p’}. We know p(a) is finite by finite-branching condition. If p(u) =0, then 
p k [u]Fal and q # [u]Fal. For suppose 3p’zp. 3p”p’-+“p” and p”# Fal. Then, 
since PEP’ and p.la, it follows that p --+’ r and rrp”; But this contradicts p(u) = $3. 
Similarly, if p(u)={pi,.. . , p;}, then p I= B and q # B, where B = 
[al(A, v. . . v A,) is as in Theorem 2.4. For suppose p # B. Then 3p’lp 3r’.p -a r’ 
and r’# A,“*. . v A,,. But since pJa and p&p’, there is a p” such that p *np” and 
P”E r’. By the first half of the theorem, P”c r’ implies J( p”) g .Z(r’). Hence, p” !# A, v 
. . . v A,,. But then p”@ p(u), which is a contradiction. •J 
3. Axiomatizing the characterizing logics 
This section offers sound and complete axiomatizations of the classical and 
intuitionistic Hennessy-Milner logics (the logics arising from KT and ZET). Let T 
range over transition systems and ET over extended transition systems. Validity is 
defined as follows: 
kKA iff V7:ifA~K~,thenVp~P,-.p+A; 
+I A iff VET. if A E ZET, then Vp E PET. p b A. 
These definitions are more general than desired. The characterization results of the 
previous section are only proved for finite branching and not for arbitrary (extended) 
transition systems. General validity, however, coincides with validity relative to 
finite branching systems (as well as finite systems). This is a consequence of the 
finite model property for the axiomatized systems below (and their completeness). 
The finite model property states that if a formula is not a theorem, then there is a 
finite model (transition system here) which falsifies it. This property can be proved 
for the systems below using the method of tableaus and signed formulas [8]: we 
omit all details here. 
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3.1. The classical system K 
The classical Hennessy-Mimer logic K is axiomatized below where A -+ B is 
defined as l(A A 1B) and [a]A as -ala. 
Axioms. (Kl) Any classical sentential calculus theorem instance; 
W) [al(A -+ B) ---z (IalA + [alW 
Rules 
(MP) ift A and E A+ B, then t B; 
(Net) if k A, then t- [a]A. 
Here the axioms and the rules are schemas where a ranges over Act. The system 
is a normal modal logic and close to minimal modal logic [4]. 
Some derived theorems are 
(9 LalTr; 
(ii) (a)(Av B) -(a)Av(a)B; 
(iii) (a)A A [a]B -+ (a)(AA B). 
The next pair of theorems state soundness and completeness. 
Theorem 3.1. If t- A, then k=K A. 
Proof. The axioms are valid and the rules preserve validity. Clearly, (Kl) is valid 
and (MP) and (Net) preserve validity. The index K is dropped from kK. 
Axiom(K2): Supposepk[a](A+B)butpl#[a]A-+[a]B.Thenpl=[a]Aand 
p # [u]B. Thus, 3q. p +a q and q # B, but also q k A. Hence, q # A -+ B. But then, 
p I# [a](A-+ B). q 
Theorem 3.2. If kK A, then k A. 
Proof. A set of K-formulas r is K-consistent iff r bL 1Tr. It suffices to show that 
every K-consistent set has a model. The method is standard, (see [4], for instance), 
so we leave out many of the details. 
Suppose r is a K-consistent set which only mentions actions in Act. Then, by 
standard reasoning, r can be extended to a maximal consistent set relative to Act. 
Let f be the set of all maximal consistent sets relative to Act. For each a E Act, 
let R, be a relation on f: 
r R, A iff if A E A, then (a)A E IY 
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Let R :Act + f x r such that R(a) = R,. Then, (r, Act, R) is a transition system. 
We shall show that it is a model for K under the stipulation 
The only nontrivial part of showing this is to prove 
(*I if (a)A E r, then 34. r R, A and A E A. 
Proofof (*): By construction. Let A0 = {B 1 [a] B E I’} u {A}. If A0 is K-consistent, 
then it can be extended to maximal consistent set A with the property r R, A. 
Suppose A,, is not K-consistent. We show that r is not consistent then, A,, k TTr, 
hence, 3B,, . . . , B, with [a]Bi E r and 
B,,..., B,,A+lTr. 
Hence, k B, A . . A B, -+ 1A by sentenial calculus, so k [a](B, A . . . A B, --+ -IA) 
by (Net) and E [~](B,A.. ‘A B,)+ [u]lA by (K2) and k[[a]B,h.. .A 
[u]B,, --f [u]lA by repeated (K2). However, [a]lA is just i( and [U.]Bi E r; 
hence, r E I(U But (u)A E r, so r is not consistent. 0 
3.2. The intuitionistic system I 
Axioms. (11) Any intuitionistic sentential calculus instance; 
(12) [a]A A [u]B --+ [u](A A B); 
(13) (u)(A v B) + (u)A v (u)B; 
(14) (u)A A [u]B -+ (u)(A A B); 
(15) [u](A v B) --+ (u)A v [u]B; 
(16) [allA-+ l(a)A; 
(17) (u)lA+ l[u]A; 
(18) l( u)Fal. 
Rules 
(MP) if k A and t A --+ B, then + B; 
(R[ 1) if + A--+ B, then + [alA+ [u]B; 
(R( )) if c A ---)L B, then !- (u)A -+ (u)B. 
Two special features of I (besides its intuitionistic basis) are the absence of the 
rule (Net) and the axiom (IS). A significant derived theorem (from (IS)) is that 
u-convergence implies a local form of excluded middle: 
or 
[u]Tr+ ((a)Trvl(u)Tr) 
[u]Tr-+ ((u)Trv [u]Fal). 
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If the only divergence is global divergence, then I needs to be supplemented by 
(19) [a]Tr-+ [b]Tr. 
The result is then a sound and complete axiomatization of validity relative to globally 
divergent transition systems. Addition of the weaker 
(19’) [a]Tr--t ([b]Trv(b)Tr) ’ 
gives the same result for CCS-like extended transition systems. Call this system, I 
plus (19’), I+. 
The next theorem states soundness of 1. 
Theorem 3.3. lf F A, then k I A. 
Proof. The axioms are valid and the rules preserve validity. We just give three cases. 
The index I is dropped from +-,. 
(15): Supposep#(I5).Then,3p’.p~p’andp’~[a](AvB)andp’#(a)Av[a]~. 
Hence, p’ia and Vq.p’-” q q b A v L?. However, p’ # (u)A, and p’ # [ u]B. Since 
p’Lu, 3 r.p’ +a r and r # B. But then r + A since p’-+O r and r b A v B, but this 
contradicts p’ #(u)A. 
(19): Suppose p # 1( u)Fal. Then 3q.p L q and q I= (u)Fal and q I# Fal, but then 
3r.q --, a r and r I= Fal which is impossible. 
(R( )): Suppose b A---f B and p I# (u)A -+ (u)B. Then 3p’.pcp’ and p’l= (u)A 
and p’ # (u)B. Hence, 3q.p’ -_za q and q k A and q if B, but this contradicts 
l=A-zB. q 
The completeness proof for I is more involved than for K. It is also less standard, 
so we spell out some of the details. We drop the index I from b,. 
Definition 3.4. A set of I formulas r is 
(i) deductiuely closed iff if r + A, then A E T; 
(ii) is or-closed iff if A, B E r, then A v BE r; 
(iii) has the or-property iff if A v B E r, then A E f or BE I’; 
(iv) is and-closed iff if A, B E r, then A A BE T. 
The intuitionistic correlate of a maximal consistent set is a prime set [8]. 
Definition 3.5. A set of f-formulas r is prime iff r is consistent, deductively closed 
and has the or-property. 
The proof of the following lemma is omitted. 
Lemma 3.6. Zfr is prime, then 
(i) {B([u]BE r} is and-closed; 
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(ii) {CI(U)CE~} is or-closed; 
(iii) {D ( D g T} is or-closed. 
We say that a set of formulas r is a-convergent, which we write as TJa, just in 
case [a]A E r for some a and A. 
The following lemma is central to the completeness theorem. We let f tc A 
abbreviate r I+ A for all A E A. 
Lemma 3.7. If r is consistent, A is or-closed and r by A, then 3prime r’ 2 r and 
T’nA =0. 
Proof. Let B,, . . . , B,, . . be an enumerated list of all formulas of the form C v D 
where Bj = C, v 0,. We define a sequence of sets I’i s ri+, such that ri tc A for all 
i. Let r, be r 
r 
r, if r, bL B, or (r, k C, or r, E D,). 
nt, = 
r, u {E} where E is C, or D, such that r,, u {E} I+ A otherwise. 
We show that each ri is defined. Suppose not. Then there is an II such that r,, bL A, 
r,~B,,I;,b~C~andr,~D~,andr,u{C,)~FforsomeF~Aandr,u{D,}~G 
for some GE A. Then, r,, u {C,} + F v G and r,, u (0,) t- F v G. Thus, 
r,, + B, + F v G by sentential intuitionistic logic. But, by (MP), r, k F v G. 
However, A is or-closed and so not(r,, t+ A). 
Let r’ = deductive closure (U,,, r,). Clearly, r’ by A and so r’ is consistent. Also, 
r’ is deductively closed. Moreover, by construction, r’ has the or-property. 0 
For each a E Act we define a relation R, on sets of formulas. 
Definition 3.8. r R, A iff 
(i) if [u]AEI’, then AEA; 
(ii) if BE A, then (a)B E L 
The following lemma shows that R, is like -ja. 
Lemma 3.9 If r is prime, then 
(i) if (a)A E r, then 3prime A.A E A and TR, A; 
(ii) if [alA@ r, then either not(rJa) or 3prime AIR, A and A g A. 
Proof. We omit the proof of (i) which is by construction. 
(ii) If then [a]A f or all a, A E I’. Suppose f Ja. Let A0 = {B ( [a]B E r} 
which is and-closed by Lemma 3.6. If A0 = 0, then TTa, contrary to our supposition. 
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Let E’= {C ((a)C .@ Z-} which is or-closed by Lemma 3.6. Let 1 be the or-closure 
of 2;‘~ {A}. If we can show A, bL 2, then A, is consistent and the result follows 
from the definition of R, and Lemma 3.7. 
Suppose A, k E for E E 2. Then, clearly, E + C v A where C ~2’. Hence, 
A, I- C v A; that is, B + C v A where [a] B E r Thus, F [ a]B * [ a]( C v A) via rule 
(R[ I). Hence, [a]( C v A) E r, but, by axiom (I5), also (a>C v [ u]A E r since I- is 
prime (a) E r or [ ?]A E r But these are impossible. 0 
We now come to the main completeness theorem. Let 3 be the set of all prime 
sets, relative to a set of actions Act and let R : Act + i’ x 2 such that R(u) = R,. 
Then we have the following theorem. 
Theorem 3.10. If I+ A, then # A. 
Proof. By Lemma 3.7, there is a prime set 2 such that AcZ 2. Let Act be the set of 
actions occurring in any formula in 2;. We show that (f, R, Act, t) is an extended 
transition system model for I with the properties: 
(i) TcA iff rs A, 
(ii) r k= A iff AE IY 
(i)(+): We omit the proof which is by induction on formulas in r. 
(i)(e): Suppose r c A. We show that E on prime sets is a partial bisimulation. 
The proof splits into two parts (a) and (b). 
Part (a): If rR,r’, then 3A’.A R,A’ and r’rd’. Let A~={A~[u]AEA}uT’. 
It is straightforward to show that AA is consistent. Let E = {D((a)DG A) which is 
or-closed by Lemma 3.6. Hence, we need only show that A,, bL 2 to prove the result. 
Suppose not. Then C A A F D, where C E I”, [u]AE A, and DE 2. Hence, by 
(R( )), t- (u)(C A A) ---, (u)D and, via axiom (14), F (u)C A [u]A -+ (u)D. But (u)C E 
r and hence also in A; hence, (u)D E A, contrary to definition of C. 
Part (b): If T&u, 
(u)B E this contradicts definition of 2, and if 
C E then [a] C E A and so A’, contrary to &. 
(ii): We omit the proof is straightforward using the definition of 
and Lemma 
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4. SCCS and CCS 
Milner proposed the Calculus of Communicating Systems, CCS, and the Syn- 
chronous Calculus of Communicating Systems, SCCS, as tractable models of concur- 
rent systems [22,24]. CCS is a model of asynchronous systems which may also 
synchronize while SCCS exclusively models synchronous systems. They are both 
transition systems whose set of processes is generated from a small set of com- 
binators; each combinator is intended to capture a distinctive intuitive concept. 
Only subsets of these systems are considered here: renaming and, also in the case 
of CCS, value passing are omitted. 
4.1. sees 
Processes in SCCS evolve relative to some universal discrete time. If p +” p’ and 
q +‘q’, then the synchronous parallel of p and q responds to the product of the 
experiments a and b, a x b, and evolves to the parallel of p’ and q’. Action product 
is captured by a structure on Act. Milner assumes that (Act, X, 1) is an abelian 
monoid: x is both commutative and associative with 1 as identity. We further assume 
the left-cancellation law: 
ifaxb=cxb, then a=c. 
The right-cancellation law also holds because x is commutative. We let ab abbreviate 
u x b. If ab = c, then let c\a = b (and c\b = a): by the cancellation laws we have 
that if d\e exists, it is unique. 
The set of SCCS expressions is determined by the following language, where 2 
ranges over a set of variables, a over the set Act, and U over (finite) subsets of 
Act-{1}: 
p::=Z(O(a.p( fixz.p~p\U~p+p(pxp. 
0 represents a process which cannot respond to any experiment. The process 
represented by a.p responds to a and evolves to p. Potentially infinite computations 
are permitted by the recursion combinator which binds free occurrences of Z in p. 
\ CJ is a restriction or prevention operator: successful responses to experiments in 
U are precluded. The operator + represents external nondeterministic choice, a 
choice the experimenter may resolve. Finally, x represents synchronous parallelism. 
For each variable Y we inductively define Y(p) to mean p is guarded in Y: 
Y(O), Y(a.p); 
if Z# Y, then Y(Z); 
if Y(p), then Y(fix 2.~) and Y(p\ U); 
if Y(p) and Y(q), then Y(p+q) and Y(pxq). 
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We say that an SCCS expression p is guarded just in case V Y. Y(p). The set of 
SCCS processes is the set of closed guarded SCCS expressions. (Without the guarded- 
ness conditions the SCCS transition system would not be finite branching.) 
There are two syntactic departures from Milner’s SCCS. To further preserve finite 
branching, we here assume a binary +-operator instead of the indexed Z-operator. 
The other departure, to preserve uniformity with CCS, is the restriction operator 
\ U. Intead of it, Milner has a permissibility operator 1 U for CT 5 Act with 1 E U: 
only experiments in U may be successful. 
The remaining undefined feature of the transition system SCCS is the transition 
relation +” (which we assume to be defined over arbitrary SCCS expressions and 
not just processes). They are the least relations satisfying (where [./.I denotes 
substitution): 
a.psp; 
if p[fix Z.p/Z] -% q, then fix Z.p G q; 
ifpsqandag U, then p\ U -% q\ Ii; 
ifp: q, thenp+r$qandr+p$q; 
ifp: p’ and q -!k q’, thenpxq2p’xq’. 
The process 0 represents ‘disaster’ since, for any p, 0 x p is unable to respond to any 
experiment. The process a.p can only respond to a and, in so doing, evolves to p. 
Offering an a-experiment to a.p + b.q, with a Z b, results in p while q is the result 
of a b-offer: when a = b the experimenter has no control over whether p or q is the 
result of an a-experiment. The number of concurrent subprocesses may increase in 
response to an experiment. This only happens when the concurrent combinator x 
occurs within the scope of a fix Z: for instance, if p = fix Z( aZ x bZ), then p +“” p x 
p. For more details of SCCS with examples, see [24]. 
4.2. CCS 
Processes in CCS may evolve asynchronously and may also synchronize. Like 
SCCS, Milner imposes a structure on the set of actions Act to capture synchrony. 
Let A be a set of atomic action and d be a set of co-actions disjoint from d and 
in bijection with it. The bijection is -: d E z stands for the co-action of a E A. Using 
-for the inverse means that a = d and so a is also the co-action of ti. Synchronization 
is only allowed between a pair of co-actions and is represented by 7. Let Act = A LJ 
du {T}. 
The set of CCS expressions is the same as SCCS except for the presence of the 
asynchronous parallel combinator 1 instead of x. In the case of restriction \ U, we 
also assume U is a (finite) subset of Act - {T} closed under co-actions. (This is a 
minor departure from standard CCS which employs \a, a # T, which is equivalent 
to \ U for U = {a, a}.) 0 stands for the CCS NIL, the process which cannot respond 
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to any experiment. In CCS, 0 does not amount to disaster since O]p does not affect 
the capabilities of p. Guardedness is the same as for SCCS (when x is replaced by 
1 in the definition of Y(p)). A CCS process is a closed guarded CCS expression. The 
transition relations +a are defined as for SCCS, except for parallel: 
if p 5 r, then p/q -f+ r/q and q/p: q/r; 
if p -% p’ and q 4 q’, then p/q-G p’(q’. 
Asynchrony of ( is represented by the first of these clauses while the possibility of 
synchrony is given by the second. Note that a.pl6.q can respond to a, a or r, whereas 
(a.Pla.q)\{ a a 1s , -1 . f arced to synchronize. For a full discussion of CCS see [22]. 
4.3. Bisimulation equivalence and its logical characterization on SCCS and CCS 
Bisimulation equivalence is a natural equivalence on SCCS and CCS. In both 
cases it is also a congruence: program contexts preserve the equivalence. CCS and 
SCCS are both finite branching. This is a result of the following stronger lemma. 
Lemma 4.1. Vp E SCCS u CCS {q 13~ E Act.p +’ q} is finite. 
Proof. By simple induction on p. The only interesting case is p = fix X.q. However, 
by the guardedness condition, 
ps r iff q[p/X]$ s[p/X] and r=s[p/X]. 0 
Therefore, Theorem 2.1 and its Corollaries 2.2 and 2.3 apply to both SCCS and 
CCS. The logical languages KT, LT, and L> for TE {SCCS, CCS} characterize 
bisimulation equivalence on 7: (Moreover, the axiomatization of K in Section 3 is 
sound and complete relative to the set of subsets of T) 
Of particular interest is the language L; which will be used to provide composi- 
tional modal proof theories for both SCCS and CCS. Recall its syntax where a 
ranges over Act and LY over finite subsets of Act. 
A::=Tr/Fal]n/A v A/A A Aj(a)l[a]A. 
The important semantic clauses are 
Pbff iff (a(3q.p: q}Gcu; 
p b (a)A iff 3q.p 5 q and q k A; 
pk[[a]A iff Vq.ifp:q,thenql=A. 
But these clauses are for processes, guarded closed SCCS/CCS expressions. Our 
aim is to construct proof systems that allow us to build a proof that p satisfies A 
from proofs of the subcomponents of p. When p = fix 2.q we would like to appeal 
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to proofs of the expression q. The semantic clauses of L> need, therefore, to be 
extended to SCCS/CCS expressions. We need only change the [a] and (Y clauses. 
(Here we closely follow Winskel’s semantics for the language without the LY atomic 
sentences [38].) 
Let p range over expressions as well as processes. 
P@=a iff p is guarded and {a ( 3q.p 5 q} 5 a; 
p != [a]A iff p is guarded and Vq. if p s q, then q K A. 
Unaffected is the interpretation over SCCS and CCS processes since, by definition, 
they are guarded. (Note that if p?a is understood as p is unguarded, then the upshot 
is a semantics for LET involving only global divergence; see [38] for an approach 
on these lines where divergence is unguarded recursion.) The significance of the 
semantic extension to expressions is contained in the next lemma (which is very 
close to Winskel’s Lemma 3.4 in [38]), where 
(fix X.p)’ = p, (fix x.p)“+’ = (fix X.P)“lPlW. 
Lemma 4.2, (i) fix X.p I= A ifs 3n > O.(fix X.p)” I= A; 
(ii) fix X.p k A i#p[fix X.p/X] l= A. 
Proof (Sketch). (See Winskel [38] for a related detailed proof.) Let m(A) be the 
maximum depth of modal operators in A. By induction on A, the following two 
hold for any q: 
(1) if p F A, then p[q/X] + A; 
(2) if m(A) = n, then q[fix X.p/X] i= A iff q[(fix X.p)“/X]. 
(i): From left to right follows from (2) when q =X. Right to left follows from 
(1) and (2). 
(ii): This follows from (2) and (i) when q = p. 0 
4.4. Unobservable actions: CCS as an extended transition system 
So far, the discussion of CCS assumes that there is an experiment corresponding 
to T. Better is the view that 7 is a silent internal event [14,22]. Experiments should 
only belong to the set A u a, Act - { T}. A redefinition of the notion of experiment 
is then necessary to take account of the presence of r and the possibility of 
synchronization. Following [ 141 we define a new CCS transition relation + in terms 
of *. Let p -+T* q stand for 
3nZO,p ,,..., pn p-I,p,A’..App,==q. 
Thus, p -+T” q means that p can evolve to q autonomously by performing internal 
events independent of experimentation. When n = 0, then p is q. Now, for a E A u & 
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let p 3“ q stand for 
3p’, p” p 5 pr -1: p” 4 q. 
The new transition relation 3” (defined in terms of --+O and --‘) may absorb any 
finite sequence of unobservable internal actions before and after a. 
The possibility of a process performing 7 (although there is no experiment 
corresponding to it) affects its response to experimentation. For instance, let p = 
a(6.0+ 7.0) and q = a(b.O+O); then, unlike q, p +” 0. Bisimulation equivaience is 
definable on CCS with its new transition relation =+‘. (The resulting equivalence is 
not a congruence [22].) But the process fix Z.r.Z which can only engage in infinite 
internal chatter is equivalent to 0, the process which can do nothing. A solution is 
to treat CCS as an extended transition system. Count as globally divergent any 
process which may perform an infinite sequence of TS. Local divergence arises when 
a process accepts an a but then immediately diverges without reporting success. 
For instance, consider p = b.O+ a.fix Z.7.Z: unlike a h-experiment the offer of an 
a-experiment may not yield a successful response because p can accept a and then 
perform 7 endlessly. (Note the use of ‘may’ here: p also can accept a and report 
success since pa” fix Z.T.Z.) Hence, p u-diverges if it can perform an infinite 
sequence of 7.r or can perform an infinite sequence of rs immediately after accepting 
a. The result is CCS as a CCS-like extended transition system: call it CCS’ to 
distinguish it from CCS as a transition system. (Note that it satisfies the property: 
if p?u and pJb, then 3q.p =$” q and qt.) Dropping the index CCS’, fix Z.T.ZEP 
for all p: a process which can only engage in infinite internal chatter is a least 
member in the partial bisimulation ordering. So fix Z.T.ZGO but Ogfix Z.T.Z. 
Similarly, 
b.O+ u.fix Z.T.ZC h.O+ u.p 
for any p. 
CCS’ is not, however, finite branching as illustrated by fix Z(u.Z(d.Z). This means 
that the logical languages Lees,, I,,,., and Jccs, do not characterize the partial 
bisimulation preorder on CCS’. Introducing infinitary disjunction and conjunction 
into these languages overcomes this. However, the linitary logical languages charac- 
terize the preorder on the subset of CCS’ without parallel which is finite branching. 
Nevertheless, we still offer a modal proof system on Lees for CCS’. To distinguish 
them from the L&, modalities we use (fat), [lull. Their meaning is 
p I= (iul)A iff 3q.p 2 q and q k A; 
p k [lullA iff pdu and Vq. if p $ q, then q I= A. 
We extend the clause for [~a/] to CCS expressions 
p + [lullA iff pJu and Vq.p % q or p 5 q implies q is 
guarded and Vq. if p $ q, then q t= A. 
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The proof system for CCS’ is built on top of the system for CCS (just as =+’ is 
defined in terms of -+7 and -“). 
5. Towards compositional modal proof systems for SCCS and CCS 
Besides axiomatizing characterizing logics, another logical enterprise is to con- 
struct sound and complete modal proof systems whose proof-theoretic consequence 
relation c is between SCCS/CCS expressions and formulas. Rules for p i- A will 
involve a mixture of structures, the combinator structure of p and the logical structure 
of A. Ideally, the proof system should be compositional. A stringent criterion is 
that the proof rules be Gentzen-style introduction rules [9], not only for the logical 
connective but also for the process combinators. Consider, for instance, rules for 
v and A: 
?)+-A PF-B PbA P+B 
PFA”B PkA”B PFAAB . 
The consequents do not depend on knowledge of either the combinator structure 
of p or the logical structure of A and B in the premises. A classical example of a 
combinator introduction rule with this feature is the sequential composition rule of 
Hoare logic. Proof-theoretic criteria for compositionality can be built from the virtue 
that understanding (and applying) the rules does not appeal to structural knowledge 
of the premises. Weaker criteria are needed in the presence of program combinators 
involving scope, parameter passing or recursion. For further remarks on composi- 
tionality, see [31,36,39]. 
The theoretical simplicity of the SCCS/CCS combinators reinforces the proposal 
to find introduction rules for the combinators as well as for connectives. The logical 
languages chosen are the negation-free characterizing languages L& and ~5.k.~~. 
(Consideration of CCS’ is delayed.) Avoiding negation allows cleaner introduction 
rules. Combinator rules are the topic of this section as a prelude to development 
of the full proof systems. 
Introduction rules for action prefixing are at the same time introduction rules for 
(a) and [a]: 
P+A PEA 
a.p E (a)A ’ a.p c [a] A' 
Their justification is that a.p must evolve to p under any u-experiment. Lemma 4.2 
licences rules for ‘fix’ introduction. 
PEA p[fix X.p/X] I- A 
fix X.p F A ’ fix X.p t- A ’ 
The first of these rules depends on the extension of the semantic clauses of L’ to 
SCCS/CCS expressions. The second appeals to standard properties of recursion 
unfolding and relies on some structural knowledge of the premise. 
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A global +-rule of the form 
p t- A qk-B 
p+qkA*B ’ 
where * is truth functional (and not the uninteresting constant true function), is 
unsound. Restricted versions which depend on the form of A and B can be found: 




Their justification is that 
evolves to. 
4 t (a)C 
P+qNw’ 
P k- [QIC 9 + [alC 
p+q+[alC . 
p + q can only evolve to an expression that either p or q 
A global parallel )I introduction rule for )I E {x, I} suffers the same fate as a global 
+-rule. But, unlike the +-case, restricted versions which depend on the forms of A 
and B are inadequate. It would be necessary to also examine the modal subformulas 
of A and of B. Even if such rules could be found, they would be in opposition to 
the type of rule we are proposing. A suggestion to overcome this is to introduce a 
parallel connective into the logic [38]: 
P+A qkB 
pllq E AIIB ’ 
If AI(B is to be unpacked into an interesting formula C without (1, then a similar 
argument applies: C will essentially depend on the modal subformulas of A and 
B. In [34,35], the author proposed an alternative approach suggested by [2]. The 
semantics of L’ are extended to include relativized semantic relations ba for each 
A E L’. It is stipulated that 
PI=~B if Vq.ifqbA,thenqj(pl=B. 
The pair of semantic relations +, KA gives a compositional semantics for 11: By 
associativity of 11, 
ifp+,Band qFBC, thenp((ql==AC. 
By introducing a relativized proof-relation, I- A introduction rules for 11 become 
straightforward and reminiscent of Gentzen’s cut rule: 
PEA q+aB P+AB 4f-BC 
pltq+-B ’ Pll9bC . 
Computationally, A in p bA B is to be understood as an ‘environment’ description 
(see [18] for a general account of environment) while logically, it is to be viewed 
as an assumption. This identification of environment and assumption resulted in 
the development of complete proof systems for SCCS and CCS without restriction. 
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But this approach cannot be naturally extended to restriction. A more general 
relativization which treats 11 symmetrically overcomes this shortcoming. 
The semantics of L’ are extended to include semantic relations A, B k C, where 
A, B, C are L’ formulas. Their meaning is given by 
A,BbC if Vp,q.ifpI==Aandq~B,thenp((qI=C. 
To give rules (and, in particular, [a] introduction rules) for a proof-theoretic correlate 
A, B k C, we need to appeal to the atomic formulas LY of L’. (Alternatively, if the 
set Act is assumed to be finite, then the languages L can be used instead; compare 
[38].) A natural Ij introduction rule follows from the stipulation: 
PEA A,BtC q+B 
PI/9 + c 
Proofs of processes involving arbitrary embeddings of ]I will closely follow syntactic 
structure. 
Finally, to take account of restriction, we introduce further relativation. When U 
is a restriction set, let p t= (, A and A, B k u C mean 
P~UA if p\Ub=A; 
A,Bb==,C if Vp.q. ifp+Aandq+B,thenpl]q+,C. 
Hence, I= is just a special case of + U when U = 0 (since p\@ is bisimulation 
equivalent to p). The introduction rule for \ U is then very straightforward, and 
justified by p\ U\ V-p\ U u V: 
P +,,,A 
P\V~.A’ 
6. Modal proof systems for SCCS, CCS and CCS’ 
Below are the rules and axioms common to SCCS and CCS. 
Axioms 
ptc: Tr, Ot,a, Oc, [a]A; 
h.yk,[u]A if a#boratCJ; 
a.qtLjol if (IE Uua; 
1 
A, B t,, Tr; 
Fal,Br-,,C, A,Falk,,C; 





A, Bt-,.C A,B+,,D 
A,Bi-,,CuD’ A,Bt,,CvD’ 
VI 
A,Bt,:C A, Dt,;C 
A,Bu Dt,,C ’ 
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AI 
A, Bt,C A, B+,D 
A,Bt,C/\D ’ 
AI 






a.p kLr (a)A 
aE U, 





p[fixX.~lXl kc, A 
lixX.p F-(, A’ fixX.p +,,A ’ 
+1 
Ptllff q&u& P tu (a)A 4 kc, (a)A P +u [alA q tu [alA 
p+q+r;a ’ p+qt, (a)A’ p+q+u(a)A’ p+q+, [alA ’ 
The only nontrivial axiom is [b]A, [c]B ku [a]C when a E U: the occurrences of 
[ b]A, [ c]B guarantee guardedness since p (( q # u [a] C if a E U when p or q is not 
guarded. The logical rules are as expected and the combinator rules were discussed 
in the previous section. Additional rules for SCCS and CCS include an extra (Y 




{c 1 a\c does not exist}; 
XI 
P&A A,Bt,C qtB 
Pxq+uC 
In the CCS additions we assume that (AA) means A is optional: if it occurs in 
a premise then it must occur in the conclusion. In the case when /3 =$3 we assume 
that Ah,+3 E is nonexistent. 
CCS additions 
p,y~~,a if ((puyu{7lifbEpand6Ey})-U)~a; 
(all 
A, Bt,C 
(a)A, B i-(, (a)C a@ ’ 
A, Bt,,C A,Bk-,C 
A, (a)B tlJ (a)C ai? ’ (/?)A, (b)B kc, (7)C’ 
CalI 
A,[a]A’(hB’)+cIC [alA(~ B), A’s0 f T, 
[a]A(hB),[a]A’(hB’)tLz [o]C ’ 
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Assume p = {h,, , h,,} where b, f 7 and a c {T} and 




P+A A, Bt-,:C q+B 
PI4 FL: C 
The most awkward and the least compositional rules are the [a], [ ~1 rules. Note 
the essential use of the atomic sentences y as a way of limiting the number of 
clauses needed in the [T] rule and SCCS [a] rule. 
The first example illustrates some of the non-parallel combinator rules. The proof 
is given in tree form: ‘leaves’ are axioms and the origin the conclusion. 
Example 6.1. ~16.0 + (a.c.O)\ U t- [ a]( b)Tr, where a E U, 
.I 
0 t- Tr 
b.0 t (b)Tr 
i:a.b.O E [a](b)Tr 
a.c.Ot, [a](b)Tr 
(a.c.O)\ U F [ a]( b)Tr 
,ur 
u.b.O+(a.c.O)\U + [u](b)Tr 
The next example proof involves a process whose number of subcomponents 
grows as its responds to experiments. We assume uii = 1. 
Example 6.2. fix Z( a.2 x (7.2) t (l)( 1)Tr. 
(I)1 
Tr, Tr i- Tr 
(ljI(OTr, (1)Tr I- (QTr 
(aXl)Tr, ($(l)Tr + (l)(l)Tr 
.I 
Z t Tr 
(1)I 
Tr, Tr F Tr Z t- Tr 




u.Z x ti.Z F (1)Tr 
.I 
fix Z( u.Z x r7.Z) + (l)Tr 
XI 
u.fix Z.( u.Z x a.Z) + (a)( l)Tr &fix Z( u.Z x d.Z) F (cS)( l)Tr 
.I 
fix I 
u.fix Z( u.Z x EZ) x &fix Z( a.Z x 6.Z) )_ (l)( 1)Tr 
fix Z( u.Z x d.Z) F (l)(l)Tr 
The final example, a CCS proof, where U = {c, F} and V = {a, ci}, illustrates the 
need for derived rules to shorten proofs. 
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Example 6.3. ((a.b.O+c.O)\U((fixZ(ii.b.Z)+)+~.O))\V~[~](b)Tr. Let G= 




G, Fal kv (b)Tr Tr, (b)Trk. (b)Tr Fal, Tr kv (b)Tr Fal, G’k, (b)Tr 
G, G’ t v [ T](b)Tr 
.I b.Ot-,Tr 
+I 
a.b.Ot, [a]Tr c.Ok, [a]Tr a.b.Oh-U [c]Fal c.01--, [c]Fal 
Al 
a.b.O+c.Ot-, [a]Tr a.b.O+c.Ot, [c]Fal a.b.0 t,[T]Fal c.0 ku [T]Fal 
AI 




C6.Z t [T]Fal 
fix I 
5.b.Z k {c, a} 
+I 
lix Z(5.b.Z) t- [T]Fal F.Ot- [TJFal +I fix Z(8.b.Z) t {c, a} c.Ot {c, n} 
AI 
fixZ(ii.b.Z)+t.Ok[~]Fal fix Z(a.b.Z)+ c.0 F {F, a} 
fixZ(r7.b.Z)+~.O~[~]Falr,{~,6} 
Z k Tr 
.I 
.I 
b.Z t (b)Tr 
ti.6.Z k [ii](b)Tr 3.b.Z t [?]Tr 0 k Tr 
fix I 
fix Z(a.6.Z) t- [a](b)Tr c.0 t [ a]( b)Tr 
fix I .I 
+I +I 
fix Z(ci.b.Z) t [c]Tr E.0 t [?]Tr 
I 
fix Z(&b.Z) + c.0 t [S](b)Tr fixZ(6.b.Z)+C.Ot [?]Tr 
fixZ(a.b.Z)+C.Ot[E](b)Tr+[t]Tr 
Hence, fix Z(& b, Z) + c.0 t- G’ and (a.b.O+ c.O)\ I/ k G. By I-introduction, 
,vl (a.b.O+c.O)\U ( fixZ(ii.b.Z)+EO~-V[~](b)Tr 
((a.b.O+c.O)\U ( fixZ(a.b.Z)+E.O)\V~[[7l(b)Tr’ 
The modal proof systems for SCCS and CCS are sound. 
Theorem 6.4. (i) Ifp kU A, then p k u A. 
(ii) IfA, B+-,C, then A, B kuC. 
Its proof is offered in the next section. Completeness can be understood in two 
ways: 
weak completeness: if pi==uAA, then p +“A, 
strong completeness: weak completeness and if A, B k u C, then 
A, Bk,C. 
The modal systems above are weak complete. Constructing strong complete systems 
is problematic. One difficulty is that if C is valid, i.e., true of every SCCS/CCS 
process, then A, B k u C for any A, B. There is not, in fact, a simple dichotomy 
between weak and strong completeness: a weak completeness result depends on a 
corresponding strong result to justify p 11 q k u A implies p 114 ku A. The details of 
this, together with the proof of Theorem 6.5, will be given in the next section. 
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Theorem 6.5. Ifp k II A, then p t (, A. 
6.1. Extending the system for CCS to CCS’ 
The proof system we offer for CCS’ is a simple extension of the CCS system. We 
offer, in fact, a system on a more general language L&, which is L;., s extended 
by the two Lees, modalities ()a~), [~a[] as well as the modalities (171) and [jr11 (whose 
meanings are like their non-r counterparts where r-divergence is simply global 
divergence, the ability to perform rX). The axioms and rules of CCS remain sound 
for this more general language. Introduction rules for (\a~), [lull for a E Actu {r} 
complete the system on L;I-(.,. The system for CCS’ arises by restricting attention 
to proofs with conclusion p F A for A E L,., s.: A does not contain occurrences of 
the L;., s atomic formulas LY or modalities (a), [a], (ITI), or [ITI] 
The following example shows how long proofs become in CCS’. 
Example6.6. a.~.b.O~O~[~a~](~b~)Tr. Let A=[a]Falr\[r]Faf, B=(b)TrA[r]Fal,and 
C = (r)(b)Tr. 













Cr,[~]B,Ar,0+[1~1](1b~)Tr Tr, 0 k Tr 
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AI 
tall 
CA[~]B,AA~~(~~~)TTA[~~~](~~~)T~ [a](C h [T]B) A [T]Fal, Fal + (lbl)TrA [ITl](lbi)Tr 
[a](C ,t [TJB) A [~]Fal,Ah0 + [a]((lbl)TrA [1T1](lb~)Tr) 
[TIT 
Fal, Ah 0 b [lal](~b~)Tr [a](C ,T [TIE) ,Y [~]Fal, Fal k [fm](lbf)Tr 
[n](C A [TIE) A [T]FaI, A AOw [T][~m](lbi)Tr 
So by [lal]Z, 
[a](C A [T]Z?) A [r]Fal, A A (4 F [lal](lbl)Tr. 
The proof is then completed by showing 
a.r.bOt [a](C A[~]B)A [r]Fal, 0kAAfl. 
When pta, no CCS’ proofs exist with conclusion p k [lal]A. Any attempted proof 
cannot be completed. For example, consider p = a.fix Z(r.Z). A proof of p k [lal]Tr 
would depend on proofs of pk[r][lal]Tr and pi-[a](Tr~[lrl]Tr). The first can 
be given but the second depends on showing fix Z(r.2) t [lrl]Tr. In turn, this 
depends on proving fix Z( r.Z) I- [r](Tr A [irl]Tr. Consequently, a proof of 
p t [ial]Tr cannot be completed as there is no limit on the number of times [ITI] 
has to be ‘unfolded’. 
Soundness and weak complete of the CCS’ system are stated in the following 
theorems which are also proved in the next section. 
Theorem 6.7. (i) Zf p t, A, then p k t, A. 
(ii) lf A, B kL, C, then A, Z? k u C. 
Theorem 6.8. p t, then F A. 
7. Proofs of soundness and completeness 
7.1. Soundness 
The following theorem states soundness of the proof systems for SCCS, CCS, 
and CCS’. Theorems 6.4 and 6.7 are then immediate corollaries. 
Theorem 7.1. (i) Zfp k-AA, then p kuA. 
(ii) ZfA, B ~~ C, then A, B ku C. 
Proof. All the axioms are valid and the rules preserve validity. We illustrate a 
number of cases. 
Axioms: b.q k u [a]A if a # b or a E U. Then, by definition, b.q. is guarded. We 
show {p 1 (b.q)\ U --)(I p} = 0. Suppose not. Then, b = a and a E U, which contradicts 
our condition. Hence, Vp. if (b.q)\U +ap, then p k A, and so, b.q ku [a]A by 
guardedness. 
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Axiom: [b]A, [c]B k u [a]C if a E U. Suppose not. Then, 3p.q.p k [b]A and 
q i= [c]B and pl(q Fu [a]C when a E U. But then pj(q is unguarded. However, this 
is impossible since p i= [b]A and q k [c]B. 
Axiom (SCCS): /3, y k u (Y if ({ ab 1 a E /I and b E y} - U) c_ IY. Suppose not. Then, 
p~~andq~=andpxq#Ua;thatis,pxq -+cp’xq’ and C&W But c=bxa 
and p +‘p’ and q -+a q’. By definition, b E /3 and a E y; therefore, c E (Y or c E lJ. 
However, c E U, so c E (Y. 
(I): Suppose A, B k ,, C and A, D k u C. Then Vp.Vq. if p k A and q k B, then 
pllq~,C,andVp.Vq.ifp~Aandq~=,thenpllq~=,C.Hence,Vp.Vq.ifpi=A 
andqkBvD,thenp(~q~UCC;thatis,A,BvD~-,C. 
([~]1) (SCCS): Suppose Ai, Bi ‘F u C for i : 1 ~i~nandp={b ,,..., b,}#@,and 
~~{c(~\~doesnotexist).Suppose~\,~,,,[a\b,]A,,~\,,,~[b,]B,~(au~)~~,[a]C. 
Then, 
3p,qpk r\ [a\b,]Ai and qk /j [bi]BiA(auP) and pXqBtu[~]C. 
b,ep b,eP 
Hence, either p x q is unguarded or p x q -+c1 p’x q’ and p’x q’ I# u C. Since 
p k [a\b,]A and q t= [b,]B,, both p and q are guarded. Hence, p x q is guarded. 
If p x q -+’ p’x q’, then p -+o’h p’ and q jh q’. Since q k (a u p), we have b E 
(a u 0). But b E (Y since a\b exists. Therefore, b is some b, E /3. However, 
p I= [a\b,]A, and q k [b,]B,, so p’l= A, and q’k Bi and p’x q’# u C. But this 
contradicts Ai, B, k u C. 
([lal]l) (CCS’): Suppose A, B ku [a](C A[IT~]C) and A, B ku [~][lal]C, but 
A, B #” [lal]C. Then, 3p, q.p k A and q b B and p\q #” [lal]C. Then, either 
(i) Plq?a or 
(ii) p(q-+T* p’ j q’ and p’( q’ is unguarded or 
(iii) p ( q 3” p’ ( q’ and p’l q’ is unguarded or 
(iv) p(q+“p’lq’ and p’lq’#“C. 
Suppose (i) holds. Then, either p 1 q -+72 or p]q +“p’( q’ and p’l q’-+‘“. If 
Pl4+7 then3r,s.p)q-‘r(s and r)s*7X‘. But this contradicts p ( q k u [ T][ 1 al] C. 
Similarly for the other case. 
Possibilities (ii) and (iii) also lead straightforwardly to contradictions. 
Suppose (iv) and p ( qla. Then, either p ( q iT r (s +” p’( q’or p ( q --+a r 1 s eT* p’( q’. 
But p\q l=u [~][lal]C and so r(s I=” [lal]C which contradicts p’lq”~~ C. Similarly 
with the second possibility r ( s k t, C A [ ITI] C. 0 
7.2. Completeness of the SCCS and CCS proof systems 
First a subset of Lb of normal forms is inductively defined. 
D::=CjCvC, 
C::=EjFjGIE A FIFA GIE A F A GlTrlFal, 
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E::=(b,)D/l . . . A (b,)D, 
F::=[a,]D, A. . . A [a,]D where a, # a, for i #j, 
G::=o. 
Let N7 be the language of disjuncts given by D. We assume m(A) is the modal 
degree of A. Let jAj7 for a E L’, be the set {p E PTlp k A}. 
Lemma 7.2. 1fA~ L$., then ABE N7such that morn and IA(T=IBI-r. 
Proof. The result follows from the following equivalences, for any T. 
(i) (Av Bl=[BvA(, (i’) IA A B( = IB A A(, 
(ii) IA v (B v C)( = /(A v B) v Cl, (ii’) IA A (B A C)l = ((A A B) A Cl, 
(iii) ITr v Al = ITr], (iii’) \Tr A AJ = JAI, 
(iv) IFal v Al = ]A/, (iv’) ]Fal A Al = IFall, 
(v) I(AvB)ACI=I(AAC)V(BAC)I, (v’) I[alA A LaPI = I[al(A A B)I, 
(vi) lCfA/?I=ICl’fTp(. q 
If AE NT, then we say that A is in normal form. If A (or B) is in normal form, 
then we let A v B, A A B stand for normal forms as determined by the above lemma. 
(Note that A A B, A v B in normal form will have modal degree less than or equal 
to A v B, A A B.) We reserve the letters C, D (possibly with indices) for conjunctions 
and disjuntions of NT. If D = C, v. .*vC,,,thenweletC~DjustincaseC=C, 
for some i, 1 d is n: similarly, for [u]D, (u)D, (Y E C. A new relativized relation 
A, B lEU C is defined where A, B E NT and C E L> for T E {SCCS, CCS}. 
Definition 7.3. Common clauses : 
(i) D, D’IkUA iff VCE D.VCE D’. C, C’ItUA, 
(ii) C, C’ IkU Tr, 
(iii) C, C’ IkUA iff C = Fal or C’= Fal, 
(iv) C’, C’Ib-UAv B iff C, C’ItUA or C, C’IEoB, 
(v) C, C’IkUA~ B iff C, C’ItUA and C, C’IE” B. 
Additional SCCS clauses for C # Fal, C’ f Fal : 
(vi) C, C’Il-oa iff p~Cand yEC’and((ub\uEBandbEy}-U)Eo, 
(vii) C, C’IEo (u)B iff a& U and (~)D’E C’ and (u\b)D~ Cand D, D’ItUB, 
(viii) C,C’lF,[a]B iff either (a~ U or cu~C’and{u\6)6~(~}=0) and 
[c]DE C and [~]D’E C’ 
ora~C’andp={u\6~6~cY}f0andV6,~p 
[u\b,]D, E C and [~,]D:E C’ and D,, 0: IF” B. 
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Additional CCS clauses for C # Fal, C’ # Fal: 
(vi’) C, C’ lkU (Y iff @CC and yEC’and ((Puru{rlif bE/3 
and 6~ y}) - U) c (Y, 
(vii’) C, C’li-r, (a)B iff a G U and either (a)D E C and D, C’ Ii-” B 
or (a>D’ E C’ and C, D’ lkU B 
or a = 7 and (~)DE C and (b)D’E C’ and D,D’kuB, 
(viii’) C, C’ItU [a]B iff either (aE U and [c]DE C and [b]D’c C’) 
or [a]DE C and [a]D’E C’ 
and both D, C’IkUB and C, D’lkUB 
and if a = 7; then (Y E C’ and Vbi E (CY -{T}) [b;]D, E C 
and [b,]D: E C’ and D,, D{ It-,, B. 
(Note that C, C’ IF U A implies C A B, C’ IF U A and C, C’ A B I+ r, A.) 
In the completeness theorem below we appeal to IkU instead of its semantic 
correlate. To do this we need an expressibility lemma. 
Lemma 7.4, Ifpllqk=,A, then 30, D’.m(Dr\ D’)cm(A) and pk D and qk D’ 
and D, D’ IF U A. 
Proof. By induction on A. 
(A = Tr): Clearly, p I== Tr and q k Tr and Tr, Tr Itr, Tr. 
(A= a): Then pj\q is guarded. 
(i) (SCCS): Let cu(p)={a\Yq.p -+a q} and similarly for a(q). Then, ({ab ( a E 
a(p) and bEa(qU)ccu, and a(p), cx(q)lt-Ucu by Definition 7.3(vi). 
(ii) (CCS): Similar. 
(A = B A E, B v E): Straightforward. 
(A=(a)B): Then ag U. 
(i) (SCCS): Then, q -+b q’ and JJ-+~‘~ p’ and p’ x q’ != U B. By induction 
hypothesis, D,, D, IFI, B, where m( D, A D2) s m(B) and p’ k D, and q’ k D2. 
Clearly, p I= (a\b)D, and q k (b)D,. Moreover, by clause (vii) of Definitions 7.3, 
(a\b)D,, lb)& II-” (a)& and m((a\b)D, A (b)D2) s m(B). 
(ii) (CSS): Similar. 
(A = [ a]B): Then p jj q k U [ a]B. Hence, p, q are both guarded. If a E U, then 
p k= [b]Tr and q k [c]Tr, and [b]Tr, [c]Tr I= U [a]B by clauses (viii), (viii’) of 
Definition 7.3. Moreover, m([b] Tr A [c]Tr) < m([a]B). 
(i) (SCCS): Let a(q)={blYq’.q ---,” q’}. Consider the set p = {b] a\b exists and 
b E a(q)}. Suppose p = $4. Then, p k [c]Tr and q I= [d]Tr A II, and, by clause (viii) 
of Definition 7.3, [c]Tr, [d]Trr\aIk” [all?. Moreover, m([c]TrA[d]TrAa)G 
m([alW. 
Otherwise, suppose p = {b, , . . . , b,}. For each b, we construct a clause [a\ b,] D, 
and [a\blW. Let q(b,)-{q,,. . . , q,,,l andlet p(a\b,)={p,,. . .,pk). Ifp(a\b,)=& 
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then let Di = Fal and 0: = Tr. Clearly, pk [a\&]Fal and qk [a\b]Tr. Otherwise, 
pixqjbuB since pxq-+Opixqj for all i:lsisk andi:lsjsm. By inductive 
hypothesis, 3D,, 0; for each i and j such that DV, 0; IEUB where pi + D, and 
q, I= D&. Moreover, m(D, A 0;) s m(B). 
Let D(i) = Q, A . . . A D,, and D’(j) = D,, A . . . A D,. Then, pi b D(i) and 
qj k D’(j). Let E = D(1) v. . . v D(k) and E’= D’(1) v. . . v D’(m). Also,pi + E for 
all i and q, k= E’ for all j and m( E A E’) s m(B). We now show E, E’ ItU B. Suppose 
not D(i), D’(j) lbLU B; i.e., D,, A . * . A D,,, Dij A . . . A Dkj lFu B. But this is imposs- 
ible since D,, D$ It” B. Hence, take D, = E and 0: = E’. 
(ii) (CCS): We build clauses 
D=(G)A[u]HA (,,A@ Vdn.>, 
D’=(G)‘A[a]ff’A (A~LbilW) A(a), 
where ( ) indicates possible non-occurrence. 
Part(a) Constructionof(G)~[a]Hand(G’)~[u]H’.Letq(u)={q’~q~“q’}= 
{qr.~..,q,J and ~(~)={P’~P--*“~‘}={P,,.. . , p,}. If q(u) =0, then G is non- 
existent and H’= Fal. Clearly, q k [a]Fal and m([u]Fal)s m([u]B). Similarly, if 
p(u) =0, then G’ is nonexistent and H = Fal. 
Suppose q(u) # 0. Then, p 1 q1 bu B for all i: 1 s is n. By inductive hypothesis, 
3Di, 0: such that 4, 0: Iku B and p k D, and q, k 0: and m(D, A D:)s m(B). 
Let G=(D,A. ..AD~) and H’=(D;v. . v DL). Hence, p /= G and q k [a] H’. 
Moreover, m(GA H’)sm(B) and G, H’IkUB. 
By a reciprocal argument, if p(u) # 0, then H, G’ lkU B. 
Part (b) Construction of l\h,t13 [ci]Di; r\,_@ [b,]Di~ a. If a # T, then these 
clauses do not exist. Otherwise, let /3 = {b) b f T and 3ql.q -+b q’}. If /3 = 0, then the 
only clause is (Y = {T}. Clearly, then q I= cr. 
Otherwise, for each b;, construct [b;]D, and [b,]D: in the same way as for SCCS 
(except replacing a\b, by 6,). Finally, cy = ,6 u {T}. 0 
We now show that the rules for A, B i-,, C are complete relative to ltU. 
Lemma 7.5. If D, D’ kU A, then 0, D’ F U A. 
Proof. By simple induction on A. We just illustrate one case. 
(A = [u]B): Suppose 0, D’It[,A. Then VC E DVC’E D’.C, C’Ik”A. If a E U, 
then [b] E E C and [c]F E C’ for some b and c. The result then follows by axiom 
and (AI) and then (VI). 
(i) (SCCS): Then, a E C’ and let ,0 = {b / u\b exists and b E cr}. If p = 0, then 
again [b] E E C and [ c]F E C’. The result then follows by SCCS axiom. 
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Otherwise, for each b;~ ,!3, [b,]DiE C’ and [a\bi]Die C and D,, 0: iEr,B. By 
inductive hypothesis, D,, 0: E Ll B. Hence, by ([ a]I) and (A I), C, C’ + U [a] B. The 
result then follows by (VI). 
(ii) (CCS): Then, [a]Er C and [~]E’E C’ and E, C’IkUB and C, E’ltUB. 
Hence, by inductive hypothesis, E, C’ tr, B and C, E’ku B. If a # T, then, since 
C =[a]E A F and C’=[a]E’h F’, the result follows by ([a][). 
Otherwise, if a = T, then a E C’ as well and Vbi E cy - {T}. [b;] 0, E C and [ b;]D: E C’ 
and Di, 0: IkU B. By inductive hypothesis, D<, 0: k-L, B. Hence, the result now 
follows by ([r]1) and (VI). Cl 
Note that this lemma, given the soundness theorem, has as a corollary that IEr, 
is sound relative to its semantic correlate. Finally, we come to the weak completeness 
theorem. 
Theorem 6.5. Ifp b (, A, then p E u A. 
Proof. By induction on m(A)-modal depth of A. 
Basis step: m(A) = 0. By subinduction on A. 
(A = Tr, Fal, B A C, B v C, (a)B, [a]B): Straightforward (the latter two do not 
arise). 
(A = (Y): By further subinduction on p. p = fix X.q is covered by the other cases 
since (fix X.q)” k I, LY and hence the result by fix I rules. 
(p = X, $5): p = X does not apply since X is not guarded and p = 0 by axiom. 
(p = aq): Then a.q k (, LY implies a E U u cy. Result by axiom. 
(p = q\ V): By definition, q\ V k u cy iff q I= riU v(~. By subinductive hypothesis, 
q k uv v LY. Hence, by \ V introduction, q\ V E u CL 
(p=q+r): Then, qfrkua. Hence, ql=u cy and r Lucy. Results follows by 
subinductive hypothesis and (+ I). 
(p=q\)r): By Lemma 7.4, 0, D’ltu (Y and qk= D and r+ D’and m(Dr\D’)s 
m(a). So, by subinductive hypothesis, q k D and r I- D. By Lemma 7.5, D, D’ +[, a. 
Hence, by /j introduction, q 11 r k u a. 
Induction step: m(A) > n. By subinduction on A. 
(A = Tr, Fal, B A C, B v C, a): Straightforward. 
(A = (a)B): By further subinduction on p: p = fix X.q, q\ U, q 1 r are as before. 
(p = X, 8): Does not apply. 
(p = b.q): Then a E U and b = a. Hence, q ku B. By inductive hypothesis, q tU B. 
BY (I), a, q k-u (a)B. 
(p = q + r): Then, q k (, (a)B or r k (, (a)B. Result follows by inductive hypothesis 
and (+I). 
(A = [ a]B): Similar to case above. 0 
7.3. Completeness of the system for CCS’ 
The final compleness result is for CCS’. Let 
( T)“A = A, (T)“+‘A=(T)(T)“A; 
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and when n > 0, let 
[T]‘A=AA[T]C for any C, 
[T]“+‘A=AA[T][T]~A. 
Lemma 7.6. (i) Ifp kr, (lal)A, then 3n, mp kU (~)“(u)(r)“A. 
(ii) Ifp bU [iallA, then 3n, mp bU [T]“[~][T]“A. 
Proof. (i): Straightforward. 
(ii): Suppose p k o [lullA. Then, (V9. if p jT* 9 or p +” 9, then 9 is guarded) 
and pia. Since -+T is image finite for any guarded 9 and p&u, we have 
3n.{qlp +T” 9} = 0, and am.{9 I3e.p j” r and r -z+~“’ 9} = 0. For, otherwise, either 
P+ Tm or 3r.p 3” r and r ---zT~. But then, ptu. Given this, it is straightforward to 
show p k=u [T-]“[u][T]“A. Cl 
Theorem 6.8. Ifp b U A, then p + U A. 
Proof. By induction on A. The only difficult cases are (ial) and [lull. We show just 
the more difficult [IUI] case. It suffices to show, given Lemma 7.6, and [lull1 rule 
and [171]1 rule, that 
(i) if p br, [T]“[u][T]“A, then p kU [u](A A [~TI]A) and p kU [T][IUI]A. 
(ii) if 0, D’lko [T]“[u][T]“A, then 0, D’I--, [u](AA[~T~]A) and 0, D’t--, 
[~][lal]A. 
(i) is straightforward by induction on p given that (ii) holds. 
(ii): By induction on n + m. 
Basis step: n+m=2. Then, D,D’IE” [u](AA[T]E)A[T]F for any E,F. By 
Definition 7.3. 
VC, C’. C, C’li-Li [u](AA[T]E)A[T]E 
Hence, C = [ a]o, A G and C’ = [ u]D, A H and 
D,, C’IkUA~[~]E and C,D,lkUA~[~]E. 
Using Definition 7.3, main induction hypothesis, and [~TI]Z, it follows that 
D,, C’+,,AA[IT~]A and C, D2~uA~[f~1]A. 
Therefore, by [a]& C, C’ ku [u](A A [ITI]A). Hence, 0, D’ kri [uI(A A [IT/IA) by 
(VI). A similar argument shows that D, D’ kU [T][~u~]A. 
Induction step: nfm>k. Suppose D, DWU [T]“+‘[u][T]“A. Then, 
D, D’lt, [u][T]~A A [T][T]“[u][T]“A. Using induction hypothesis and Definition 
7.3 and ([all) the result follows. Similarly for D, D’lk, [T]“[u][T]“+‘A. 0 
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